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 
Abstract—The aim of this paper is to develop an empirical 
research on the nature and consequences of corporate governance on 
Eurozone Insurance Industry risk taking attitude. More particularly, 
we analyzed the effect of public ownership on risk taking with 
respect to privately held Insurance Companies. We also analyzed the 
effects on risk taking attitude of different degrees of ownership 
concentration, directors compensation, and the dimension/diversity of 
the Board of Directors. Our results provide quite strong evidence that, 
coherently with the Agency Theory, publicly traded insurance 
companies with more concentrated ownership are less risky than the 
corresponding privately held. 
Keywords—Agency theory, corporate governance, insurance 
companies, risk taking.  
I. INTRODUCTION 
OTH corporate governance and risk taking have been for 
a long period of time at the centre of numerous studies, 
especially in the last decade. After the global financial crisis 
started in 2007, the attention to risk-related topics has even 
increased. “Clearly, one of the result financial crisis is an 
increased focus on the effectiveness of board risk oversight 
practices” [13]. The Insurance Industry is particularly 
involved in topics regarding risk, as managing it efficiently 
can be considered the “core business” of any insurance (and 
re-insurance) company. The entire financial sector – included 
the insurance industry - has been deeply involved in the most 
recent financial crises. Many insurance company’s difficulties 
may certainly be directly connected with excesses in risk 
taking (one for all the bailout of AIG by the US Government) 
and opportunistic behavior of their managers. Parallel to this, 
from the beginning of the XXI century on, big financial 
scandals such as Enron, Worldcom, Parmalat, XL Holidays 
renewed the attention on corporate governance aspects. 
Moreover, the collapse of big banks and financial institutions 
all over the world (such as Royal Merchant Bank Limited, 
Rims Merchant Bank Limited, Financial Merchant Bank 
Limited, Progress Merchant Bank Plc, Republic Merchant 
Bank Limited) strengthened the urge for new rules and more 
investigation on these topics [43]. It has been clearly shown 
that an appropriate and effective corporate governance 
framework is necessary to recognize and protect the rights and 
interests of all those parties that have relationships with the 
company, named stakeholders. In other words, the relationship 
between corporate governance and risk-taking is quite strong 
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and, according to our view, especially in the financial sector 
(and specifically in insurance industry), there is still a lot of 
room for more studies and more in-depth analysis in this field. 
In the last decay, increasing during the crisis and even more 
recently, lots of questions regarding, among others, the level 
of risk, risk management, asset-liabilities approaches (ALM), 
the importance of regulation, executive compensations, 
ownership structures, board of directors duties, the action and 
duties of auditors and monitoring mechanisms have been 
largely debated. The magnitude of the crisis and its global 
effects have added even more importance to those topics, even 
if it hasn’t come up with a definite theoretical framework and 
solutions. Moreover, with a specific focus on the insurance 
sector, according to our studies, there is still a lot of room for 
improvement and more studies concerning risk taking, risk 
management and executive behaviors. 
The aim of this paper is to analyze the impact of some 
corporate governance elements on risk taking, with a specific 
reference to the European insurance industry. 
The innovative points of this study can be traced in the 
focus only on insurance sector (exclusion of financial 
companies from most of the corporate governance studies is 
quite common in this research field) and in looking for direct 
connection between corporate governance elements on risk 
taking (rather than on performance measure).  
II. THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK
The theoretical framework of our study refers mainly to: 
- The insurance industry 
- Agency theory 
- Stakeholders theory 
- Corporate Governance  
As for the Insurance Industry, it should be pointed out that, 
because of some specific aspects, this sector can be considered 
a “unique” and even “different” not only from other sectors 
but also from other financial companies (i.e. from banks, 
investment funds, etc.). The most important peculiarities that 
differentiate insurance companies from all the other kind of 
“firms” can be traced mainly in the following elements: 
- Insurance is a strictly regulated sector. Regulation for 
insurance company designs at many different levels and 
covers both solvency and prices [23]. 
- There are a lot of different regulators that set rules and 
laws at different levels, largely affecting the activities, 
duties, management, accounting and disclosures of 
insurance companies. Sometimes different rules coming 
from different regulatory authorities are not perfectly 
homogenized. 
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- Inversion of the production cycle, as in the insurance 
business the premiums received by the insurance 
(revenues) precede the payments of an eventual claim 
(costs). 
- In the insurance business, opposite to almost all of the 
other production activities, revenues (coming from 
premiums) are quite certain, whereas operational costs 
(coming from eventual claims, especially in non-life 
insurance) are uncertain (in not only their amount, but 
also regarding the time). Using Latin words, we could say 
that the uncertainty of insurance costs refers to “an, 
quantum et quando”. “The exploitation cycle is inverted 
[...] namely the accounting and management 
consequences of the prefinancing of the service, the cost 
of which is not exactly known in advance” [5]. In other 
words, insurers may know their actual costs only after a 
policy has expired. 
- Due to the “inverted cycle” and the uncertainty of almost 
all the operating costs, asset management and investment 
decisions of an insurance company are particularly 
important and strictly connected with its core business. 
This is because premiums have to be invested until claims 
and expenses have to be paid. As a consequence, 
investments in financial assets represent the majority of 
insurance assets.  
- Insurance companies differ from banks and other 
companies also in terms of board structure [39]. 
- Insurance companies have a widely recognized “social 
relevance” and social responsibility, especially with the 
community, the policyholders and the market. This is 
mainly because they are important institutional investors 
(due to the previous points) as well as risk-taker. 
Due to all these points, risk taking and risk management 
become very important for the insurance company, more than 
for any other entity of different sectors. Moreover, the global 
financial crisis has confirmed the importance and danger of 
risks. In fact, specifically the banking, insurance and financial 
services industries have been hardly hit by investments in 
risky financial instruments, including sub-prime loans, 
mortgage-backed securities and structured investment 
vehicles. All those unique features motivate us to further 
investigation, research and examine the relation between some 
corporate governance features and risk taking. Another 
important theoretical background for our study is the wide 
framework of the agency theory [27], since we analyze the 
effect of elements such as ownership concentration, board 
composition and executive compensation on risk taking 
attitude. The root of the agency theory is the relationship 
between the owners of the company (principals) and the 
managers and executives (agent). According to this theory, the 
principals delegate the running of the business to “their” 
agents [1], expecting that the executives will act and take 
decisions in the owners’ interests. The problem is that, due to 
information asymmetry, managers may not act and behave in 
their principals interests [27]. 
An effective and correct corporate governance structure (not 
only for insurance companies) require appropriate standards in 
order to recognize, protect and promote the rights, 
relationships and interests of all the parties that are involved 
with the firm’s activities. All those parties, named 
stakeholders, have been largely studied in literature in the 
“stakeholders theories”. Among the most important 
stakeholders of an insurance company, with possible conflicts 
of interest, there are: owners, managers, board of directors, 
auditors, actuaries, employees, policyholders and regulators 
[37], [45]. 
III. LITERATURE REVIEW 
The literature has identified several problems resulting from 
the agency relationship between principals and agents. 
However, several governance mechanisms have also been 
developed to control and solve this problem. Those 
mechanisms are usually divided into external mechanisms and 
internal mechanisms. Among the internal mechanisms that 
solve the principal-agent problem there are the characteristics 
of the Board of Directors (BODs) [8], [40], [41], duality of the 
CEO [16], managerial compensation [20], [35], insider 
ownership [9], [26], [27] large stakeholders and blockholders 
[10], debt and dividend policies [21]. On the other hand, are 
considered external mechanisms: threat of takeover [17], [19], 
[27], financial analysts [38], legal environment, minority 
shareholders protection [28]. 
We took into consideration only some internal mechanisms 
among those mentioned and particularly some characteristics 
of the Board of Directors and ownership concentration. Our 
objective is to study the effect of some corporate governance 
elements, some of them deeply affected by the principal-agent 
relationship, on risk taking in European Insurance sector. 
A large literature has analyzed the effect of corporate 
governance variables on firms performance, but only few 
studies have investigated on the impact of those variables on 
risk taking, particularly in the financial sector and, moreover, 
in the insurance industry [6]. 
The analysis of risk taking and risk management has an 
increasing importance in all sectors, especially in the financial 
industry and for insurance companies. The Basel Committee 
(for the banking system) and the Solvency Directives (for EU 
insurance companies) clearly focused the improvements, 
efforts and the attention that should be paid to risk-related 
topics at all levels. 
“Enterprise risk management is a process, effected by 
the entity’s board of directors, management, and other 
personnel, applied in strategy setting and across the 
enterprise, designed to identify potential events that may 
affect the entity, and manage risk to be within the risk 
appetite, to provide reasonable assurance regarding the 
achievement of objectives” [12]. 
The effects of Board of Directors characteristics and 
diversity (size, composition, gender, kinds of expertise, age, 
education, values, etc...) on insurance company’s 
performances have been largely studied, even with different 
and sometimes contrasting results [22], [33], [34], [37], [42], 
[44], [46]. 
Lipton [30], [31] provides a qualitative description (mainly 
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from a legal point of view) of the role of the board in 
corporate risk management, stating that “the board cannot and 
should not be involved in actual day-to-day risk management”. 
Maingot [32] had analyzed the consequences of the 
financial crisis on the management of risks in the financial 
services sector in Canada, tracking fourteen types of risk and 
categorizing them by level of risk exposure, risk consequence 
and risk management disclosures. They found very minor 
changes in the risk disclosures from 2007 to 2008. 
Ballou [2] had published a survey of current Directors of 
publicly traded companies examining the type and quality of 
risk information received from management. The conclusion 
was that without any doubt pressure on the boards of directors 
of publicly traded companies to perform increased oversight in 
the area of risk management will absolutely continue to rise as 
there are still a high number of opportunities to improve the 
nature and extent of risk information provided to the board. 
Only some recent studies have focused their attention on the 
relationship between corporate governance aspects and risk in 
the insurance sector. Cheng [7] analyzed the relationship 
between risk-taking attitude and institutional ownership of 
life-health insurance companies, finding evidence that 
institutional ownership stability reduces total risk, but 
increases leverage and investment risk. Cole [11] analyzed the 
effect of ownership concentration on risk taking, whereas 
Eling and Marek [18] found specific evidence only in the UK 
and German Insurance Market.  
IV. RESEARCH QUESTIONS 
Inside the theoretical framework and given the existing 
related literature, our paper aims to answer to the following 
research questions. 
RQ1: Are publicly traded Insurance Companies less risky 
than other similar privately-held Companies? 
According to the agency theory, the managers of a publicly 
traded company would probably take less risk than desired by 
their principals (owners). This means that a publicly-held 
company would be less risky than an otherwise similar 
privately-held company, where there is a closer alignment 
between principal and agent interests. 
RQ2: Is an Insurance Company with higher ownership 
concentration less risky than an otherwise similar Company 
with lower concentration? 
According to the agency theory and some literature on the 
topic, higher ownership concentration means more control by 
the owners on the managers. Empirically larger shareholders 
are generally associated with higher performances, even if 
there are some mixed results. Higher concentration and better 
performance may suppose higher risk-taking levels. 
RQ3: Do higher directors compensation correspond to 
higher risk-taking? 
In non-financial companies, the relationship between 
managers compensations and firms performance and risk-
taking have been largely studied, even if there are a lot of 
contrasting contributions and empirical evidence. It is 
generally accepted that compensation incentives may be used 
to align the interests of owners and managers, even in 
insurance companies [35]. With higher compensations, 
directors are expected to work harder and perform better 
performances. If the compensation is linked with the 
performance, it can lead directors to take more risk (and 
higher return). 
The relationship between manager compensations, 
corporate governance, and risk-taking is particularly 
interesting, even if the empirical evidence is not entirely 
conclusive. In April 2009, Mary Schapiro, SEC Chairman, 
announced that he “want(s) to make sure that shareholders 
fully understand how compensation structures and practices 
drive an executive's risk-taking. The Commission will be 
considering whether greater disclosure is needed about how a 
company — and the company's board in particular — manages 
risks, both generally and in the context of setting 
compensation”. Some researches [14], [25] found a negative 
empirical relation between compensation and risk taking, but, 
at the same time, more recent ones [24] found no significant 
statistical correlation at all. 
RQ4: Are Insurance Companies with larger board of 
directors (BODs) less risky than companies with smaller 
boards? In other words, does the dimension of the BODs 
affect risk taking? 
Sah and Stiglitz [40], [41] analysed the effect of the 
dimension of the board of directors, arguing that larger boards 
tend to reject risky projects as it is more difficult to convince a 
large number of directors that a risky project is worthwhile. In 
other words, according to some theories, larger boards reflect 
communication problems and more difficulties for the board 
to find an agreement on higher risk-taking policies and 
decisions. On the other hand, other researches [29], analyzing 
the US insurance industry, found lower risk only for asset 
risks, whereas, as the dimension of the board increase, they 
found higher systematic risk and also higher equity risk. These 
contrasting results have not been explained yet inside an 
organic theoretical framework. 
RQ5: Are Insurance Companies with more heterogeneous 
board of directors (BODs) less risky than companies with 
more homogenous ones?  
In this analysis, we took into consideration gender 
composition of BODs and the nationality of the directors. 
Both theoretical and empirical findings on the relationship 
among gender diversity of the board, performance and risk-
taking are inconclusive. The same seems to be for the impact 
on firms’ performance and risk taking of foreign directorship. 
It is generally accepted that higher diversity of the board of 
directors makes managers act more ethically and take less risk 
(as it is more difficult to converge on higher risk actions). 
V. METHODOLOGY AND DATA 
This section describes the methods used in developing the 
research, collecting and analyzing data, and the description of 
the variables. 
A. Data 
Many different sources have been used to collect the data 
for this research. First of all, several academic journals and 
World Academy of Science, Engineering and Technology
International Journal of Social, Behavioral, Educational, Economic, Business and Industrial Engineering Vol:10, No:1, 2016 
190International Scholarly and Scientific Research & Innovation 10(1) 2016 scholar.waset.org/1999.10/10003457
In
te
rn
at
io
na
l S
ci
en
ce
 In
de
x,
 E
co
no
m
ic
s a
nd
 M
an
ag
em
en
t E
ng
in
ee
rin
g 
V
ol
:1
0,
 N
o:
1,
 2
01
6 
w
as
et
.o
rg
/P
ub
lic
at
io
n/
10
00
34
57
  
articles have been analyzed for a better understanding of the 
theoretical framework and the previous academic studies. For 
the empirical analysis, data have been collected largely from 
the ISIS database (provided by Bureau van Dijk). Additional 
data have been collected through the websites of insurance 
companies, from EIOPA (European Insurance and 
Occupational Pensions Authority) and the national association 
of insurance companies in different EU Countries. 
The analysis of this research have been conducted on the 
basis of 396 observations coming from 126 insurance 
companies from the 27 EU Countries (Croatia has not been 
included as it entered the EU only on July 2013) in the period 
running from 2009 to the end of 2013. 
B. Regression Analysis 
The first step of the data analysis was the correlation 
analysis in order to determine statistically the level of 
association between the variables considered in the model and 
to detect any chance of multicollinearity. Multiple regression 
analysis is the statistical method employed in this study. 
In the regression analysis, we considered as dependent 
variable a measure of risk. In previous academic research and 
in literature there exists a wide variety of variables used as 
proxy for risk taking. Traditionally, the classical capital 
structure literature [36] distinguishes between business risk 
and financial risk. Business risk is then generally referred to 
the two main areas of insurance business activity: investing 
and underwriting. Other theories and studies distinguish 
among asset risk, product risk and total risk. Literature on risk 
taking in insurance companies uses a wide range of different 
measures: market risk measures, accounting risk measures and 
risk-based capital measures. 
Following previous research [18], we use the logarithm of 
the ratio of total assets to total net equity as a proxy for 
financial risk. This is a measure for the leverage of the insurer 
that proxies financial risk under the adoption of the so-called 
“finite risk paradigm”. This hypothesis assumes that capital 
and risk are positively related [3], [4], [15]. Many studies 
suggest clearly that the insurance industry operates within this 
paradigm rather than the so-called excessive risk paradigm, 
even if there are some studies, mainly related to the financial 
crisis, that do not support the finite risk paradigm. 
For the multiple regression analysis, we use (1): 
 
tttiti CXRISK   2,10,         (1) 
 
where:
tiRISK ,   is the vector of the dependent variable (risk), 
tiX , is a vector of the corporate governance variables. that 
have to be tested for the study (described in the following 
paragraph) that may affect the risk-level. tC   is a vector of 
variables that controls for each firms characteristics 
(dimension, technical reserves, profitability, group, 
internationality). t  is the vector of unobserved scalar random 
variables (errors). 
Finally, we assume that the variable Y୧,୲ is influenced by a 
stochastic error ߝ௧ with the standard assumption of strict exogeneity (conditional mean equals to zero; absence of 
correlation and constancy of the variance). 
C. Variables Description 
The dependent variable is the risk-measure (RISK), that in 
this study is the ratio of total assets to total net equity. 
The corporate governance variables include the following 
variables: 
 PUB: Publicly traded vs. privately traded company. For 
the ownership, we distinguish between privately held and 
publicly traded insurance companies by whether the firm 
is listed or not (i.e. it issues publicly traded stocks). 
According to these criteria, we labeled as “listed 
companies” those whose shares are traded on a main stock 
exchange in an EU Country. It is a dummy variable that is 
equal to 1 if the company is publicly traded and 0 
otherwise. 
 OWN: is the ownership concentration, measured as the 
percentage of shares owned by the five largest 
stockholders of the Company. 
 BCOMP: it measures the Board of Directors 
compensations considering the total amount of all the 
emoluments to all Directors. 
 BSIZE: Size of the Board as the number of directors on 
the Board of Directors of each Insurance Company in a 
particular financial year. 
 BFEM: Gender diversity of the Board, measured as the 
percentage of female directors in the board. 
 BNAT: Board nationality as the number of Countries the 
directors come from. 
In the vector ܥ௧ there are other variables to control for each company’s characteristics. All the variables are described in 
Table I.  
D. Results and Discussion 
This section presents the results obtained from the research 
and the data analysis, with a discussion of the major findings. 
In Table II are reported the descriptive statistics for the data 
set. 
PUB is a dummy variable, whose values are 0 or 1. The 
average value of 0,833 denotes that there is definitely a 
predominance of public insurance companies in Europe. 
With regard to the ownership concentration, our statistics 
show that the average of the sample is 21% (shares owned by 
the five largest shareholders), with a minimum of 7% and a 
maximum of 81%. 
The Board of Directors compensations has an average value 
of 18.705.290 Euro, while the average dimension of the Board 
is close to 13 members. The average percentage of female in 
the Boards is 23% (less than 1 to 4), while the average number 
of Country the Directors come from is only 2. 
The average value of ROE is around 7%, with a maximum 
of 53% and a minimum of -26%. 
Table III reports the results of the multivariate regression 
models, with the corresponding t-statistics, R-square and 
adjusted R-square. 
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TABLE I 
VARIABLES DESCRIPTION 
Variable Meaning Description 
RISK Measure of Risk Log of the ratio between total assets and net equity 
PUB Public or Private Company 
Dummy variable (1=publicly traded; 
0=privately held) 
OWN Ownership Concentration 
% of shares owned by the five largest 
stockholders 
BCOMP Board Compensation Total Emoluments to all Directors (Euro) 
BSIZE Board Size Number of the members in the Board of Directors 
BFEM Gender of the Directors % of female member in the Board of Directors 
BNAT Nationalities of the Directors 
Number of different nationality of the 
Directors 
DIM Company Dimension Log of total Assets 
RES Technical Reserves Log of Technical Reserves 
ROE Profitability Ratio of net income and net equity 
GRP Part of a group Dummy variable (1=part of a group; 0=otherwise) 
INT International Activity Dummy variable (1=international activities; 0=otherwise) 
 
TABLE II 
DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS 
Variable Mean Median St. Dev. Min Max 
RISK 1.210 1.161 0.185 0.682 1.442 
PUB 0.833 1.0 0.373 0.0 1.0 
OWN 0.210 0.208 0.081 0.070 0.810 
BCOMP 18,705,290 13,053,585 13,891,387 7,388,750 42,078,000 
BSIZE 12.924 11.000 5.495 6.000 26.000 
BFEM 0.228 0.192 0.091 0.091 0.364 
BNAT 2.056 2.000 0.706 1.0 4.0 
DIM 11.157 11.610 0.735 9.910 11.852 
RES 10.775 11.139 0.945 8.623 11.673 
ROE 0.068 0.079 0.098 -0.258 0.535 
GRP 0.778 1.0 0.416 0.0 1.0 
INT 0.889 1.0 0.315 0.0 1.0 
 
The value of the R-square shows that the overall goodness 
of fit of the multivariate regression is really good. The F-test 
in the analysis of variance (ANOVA) shows that in the 
regressions at least one of the parameter is linearly related to 
the dependent variable (risk). 
Regarding the independent variables, we find a significant 
statistical correlation (at 95%) with the dependent variable 
(risk) for: 
- PUB: there is a negative significant correlation for the 
variable of private/public ownership. This means that 
publicly traded Insurance Companies are less risky than 
other similar privately-held Companies. This is coherent 
with the theoretical framework and previous literature. 
- OWN: there is a negative significant correlation for the 
ownership concentration, as companies with larger and 
stronger owners take less risk than the other company 
with lower level of ownership concentration, as theory 
predicts. 
- BSIZE: we find a negative coefficient for the variable that 
counts for Board dimensions. This suggests that 
Companies with bigger Boards (Board with a higher 
number of directors) take less risk than smaller ones. The 
theoretical explanation was that larger board find more 
difficult to converge to very risky projects. 
- DIM: there is a positive correlation with the variable 
“dimension”. Bigger companies take more risk than 
smaller ones. 
- RES: the amount of technical reserves helps to measure 
the dimension of the “operational activity” of an 
insurance company. The amount of reserves counts also 
for the amount of obligation that the company have 
towards its policy-holders. The correlation is positive as 
the companies with higher amount of (technical) reserves 
tale more risk. 
- ROE: insurance companies with higher profitability 
(ROE) take less risk. This result may be quite surprising 
as the standard theory would suggest that taking more risk 
generally implies higher returns. 
- GRP: being part of a group means taking more risk.  
- INT: insurance companies that play in an international 
context (more than one Country) are less risky than the 
“national” ones. 
VI. SUMMARY AND CONCLUDING COMMENTS 
This section presents the results obtained from the research 
and the data analysis, with a discussion of the hypothesis and 
the research questions. 
Firstly, in line with much of the extant literature, we have 
empirically documented that corporate governance deeply 
affects (financial) risk taking. The regression model denotes a 
good fit and a quite high explanatory power. Therefore, it is 
really important for the insurance company to have a high 
control on corporate governance variables and to promote a 
good and positive culture relating to those topics. 
According to our analysis, we find quite strong evidence 
supporting our hypothesis and the existing literature. The 
results of the regression, allow us to answer positively to RQ 
n. 1-2-4. We could not say anything about RQ 3-5 as there 
those variables are not statistically significant. 
We provide evidence that, according to our regression 
analysis, Insurance Companies publicly traded, with higher 
ownership concentration and larger Board of Directors are less 
risky than other similar privately-held Companies, with lower 
ownership concentration and a lower number of Directors. 
The effects of board diversity on risk taking need more 
specific analysis as in this model it is not statistically 
significant. The average value of the female number of 
directors is still quite low (less than 1 director on 4 is a 
woman). 
The major limit of this analysis may be found in the use of 
only one measure of risk (more specifically financial risk). 
The same analysis may be developed and extended to different 
measure of risk (product risk, total risk, etc...), also using more 
than one variable. 
Further development may be conducted analyzing other risk 
measures as well as including more corporate governance 
variables (for example investigating more in depth board 
diversity, with more specific variables). 
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TABLE III 
REGRESSION RESULTS 
Regression Statistics 
Multiple R 0,8882 
R Square 0,7889 
Adjusted R Square 0,7828 
Standard Error 0,0862 
Observations 396 
 df SS MS F 
Significance 
F 
Regression 11 10,6557 0,9687 130,4361 0,0000 
Residual 384 2,8518 0,0074 
Total 395 13,5075 
 Coefficients 
Standard 
Error t-Stat P-value 
Lower 
95% Upper 95%
Intercept -1,1330 0,1249 -9,0709 0,0000 -1,3785 -0,8874 
PUB -0,0459 0,0162 -2,8320 0,0049 -0,0777 -0,0140 
OWN -1,1138 0,1206 -9,2385 0,0000 -1,3508 -0,8767 
COMP 0,0000 0,0000 1,6913 0,0916 0,0000 0,0000 
BSIZE -0,0066 0,0011 -5,7899 0,0000 -0,0089 -0,0044 
BFEM -0,1171 0,0948 -1,2356 0,2174 -0,3035 0,0693 
BNAT 0,0092 0,0105 0,8774 0,3808 -0,0114 0,0297 
DIM 0,1190 0,0103 11,5387 0,0000 0,0988 0,1393 
RES 0,1290 0,0104 12,4545 0,0000 0,1086 0,1493 
ROE -0,1937 0,0529 -3,6655 0,0003 -0,2976 -0,0898 
GRP 0,0494 0,0165 2,9985 0,0029 0,0170 0,0818 
INT -0,0624 0,0182 -3,4296 0,0007 -0,0981 -0,0266 
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